COMMUNAL DEADLOCK AND A WAY TO SOLVE IT 365
was exactly what happened to the Irish Treaty. The Irish Treaty continued to override the Irish Constitution so long as Ireland was not a Dominion. But the moment Ireland became a Dominion the over riding power of the Treaty was taken away by a short and simple enactment of the Parliament of the Irish Free State and the British Parliament did nothing, for it knew that Ireland was a Dominion and therefore it could do nothing. How so absurd a provision came to be put forth by so eminent a person to assure the minorities, I am unable to understand.
The provisions contained in the Sapru proposals appear to be an improvement. But are they really an improvement ? I am sure they are not. A three-fourths majority of 160 means that a view to prevail must have the support of 120 members. Before accepting this as an improvement, one has to have some idea as to how this group of 120 is likely to be formed. If the Hindus and the Muslims combine they will together make up 102 and will need only 18 more to make up 120. Most of the special seats and a few more from others may easily fall into the hands of this combine. If this happens the decision of the Assembly will obviously be an imposition upon the Scheduled Castes, the Sikhs, the Indian Christians etc. Similarly, if the Muslims are isolated the decision will not be a joint decision but an imposition upon the Muslims by non-Muslims. These possibilities of permutation and combination for the purpose of check-mating or out-manouvering of some communities by others, I am sorry to say, have not been taken into consideration by the Sapru Committee. There would have been some safety, if the Sapru Committee had provided that the three-fourths majority shall at least include
50 per cent of each element.
Following upon the procedure adopted in the making of the constitution of the United States, the Sapru Committee could have added a further provision for the ratification at any rate of the communal part of the decision of the Assembly by the representatives of the minorities outside the Assembly. None of these provisions finds a place in the plan of the Constituent Assembly as designed by the Sapru Committee. Consequently the Constituent Assembly has become a snare.
There are many other arguments against the plan of a Constituent Assembly. I may mention one, which I confess has influenced me greatly. When I read the history of the Union between Scotland and England, I was shocked at the corruption and bribery that was practised to win the consent of the Scottish Parliament. The whole of the Scottish Parliament was bought. The chances of corruption and bribery being used in the Indian Constituent Assembly to buy over members to support decisions desired by interested groups are very real. Their effects, I am sure, cannot be overlooked. If this happens, it will not only make mockery of the Constituent Assembly but I feel quite certain that any attempt made to enforce its decisions will result in a civil war. It is my considered opinion that the proposal of Constituent Assembly is more dangerous than profitable and should not be entertained.