374 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
(2) The relative majority of representation given to a majority community in the legislature should not be so large as to enable the majority to establish its rule with the help of the smallest minorities.
(3) The distribution of seats should be so made that a combination of the majority and one of the major minorities should not give the combine such a majority as to make them impervious to the interest of the minorities.
(4) The distribution should be so made that if all the minorities combine they could, without depending on the majority, form a government of their own.
(5) The weightage taken from the majority should be distributed among the minorities in inverse proportion to their social standing, economic position and educational condition so that a minority which is large and which has a better social, educational and economic standing gets a lesser amount of weightage than a minority whose numbers are less and whose educational, economic and social position is inferior to that of the others.
If I may say so, the representation is a balanced representation. No one community is placed in a position to dominate others by reason of its numbers. The Muslim objection to the Hindu majority and the Hindu and Sikh objections to the Muslim majority are completely eliminated, both in the Central as well as in the Provinces.
VIII
NATURE OF THE ELECTORATE
With regard to the question of electorates the following propositions should be accepted :
(1) Joint electorate or separate electorate is a matter of machinery for achieving a given purpose. It is not a matter of principle.
(2) The purpose is to enable a minority to select candidates to the Legislature who will be real and not nominal representatives of the minority.
(3) While separate electorate gives an absolute guarantee to the minority, that its representatives will be no others except those who enjoy its confidence, a system of joint electorates which will give equal protection to the minorities should not be overlooked.
(4) A Four-member constituency, with a right to the minorities to have a double vote and requiring a minimum percentage of minority votes, may be considered as a possible substitute.