z:\ ambedkar\vol-02\vol2-05.indd MK SJ+YS 21-9-2013/YS-8-11-2013 326
326 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
It is of course open to argument that if the ministers did not resign it is because the Council did not intend by these divisions to indicate want of confidence ; otherwise it would have refused supplies to the ministers whom it had discredited by its adverse vote. That the Bombay Legislative Council was too effete to impose its will effectively upon the ministers is a fact too well known to need mention. Its division into cliques and factions, its vicious way of following men rather than principles, made it a toy in the hands of the executive, so much so, that the House as a whole failed to exercise even the selective function which any popular House conscious of its power is expected to fulfil. Any popular House, howsoever dominated by the executive, will not tolerate the candidature of any member of the House for office unless he shows that he has some power of speech, some dexterity in the handling of a subject, some readiness of reply and above all some definite vision which can constitute the basis of a rational policy of social and economical betterment. Even in England where the dominance of the cabinet is as complete as it could be, no Prime Minister in filling the subordinate offices of Government will choose men who have not shown themselves acceptable to the House of Commons. The Legislative Council of Bombay was incapable even of this, with the result that the choice for political office did not always fall on the best man available. But supposing that the Council being better organised, had imposed its will more effectively on the executive. What would have been the result ? Would it have made dyarchy work as a responsible form of Government ? My answer is emphatically in the negative. For, any effective action on the part of the legislature against the Executive can produce only one result, namely, it will lead to the use by the Governor of the emergency powers of suspension and certification, which are entrusted to him under the Act. That this is the inevitable result of strong action on the part of the legislature is the testimony of all provinces where the constitution has been suspended. But to admit this is to admit that the moment the Council begins to assert its power to the fullest extent dyarchy must crumble unless jacked by the emergency powers of the Governor. It is therefore obvious that in either case dyarchy fails. It fails by the inaction of the legislature as in the Bombay Presidency. It fails as much by the action of legislature as in Central Provinces. In the one case by reason of the weakness of the legislature the executive gets the freedom to be irresponsible. In the other case the legislature by force of action compels the Governor to keep into being an irresponsible executive.
Many have suggested that dyarchy would have worked better if the Governor has chosen to conduct himself as a constitutional head in accordance with the provisions of Section 52( 3 ) and the advice given by the Joint Parliamentary Committee. I do not share this view. First of all there is no foundation of facts to support the contention that the Governor was bound to act as a constitutional head. It is often forgotten that though the dyarchical form of government was selected as being a responsible form of government implying that the Governor in relation to the ministers was to