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PROVINCIAL EXECUTIVE 333
against wrongful acts of ministers. To allow the situation to continue, is to destroy the very basis of constitutional government. I therefore recommend that sections 110 and 111 of the Government of India Act should be amended so as to allow all British subjects, whether Indian or European, the right to resort to the Courts in respect of illegal acts ordered by ministers. Such a change in the law was urged in 1919 in respect of ministers. But it was not then accepted because its acceptance, it was thought, would introduce an invidious distinction between Ministers and Executive Councillors. With the introduction of full responsible government in the Provinces, this objection does not survive.
I hold so strongly to the view of enforcing legal responsibility of ministers for illegal acts that I propose that the constitution should provide for the constitution of a tribunal composed of the Legislature or partly of the Legislature and partly of the Judiciary before which ministers may be impeached for acts unlawful in themselves or acts prejudicial to the national welfare. I am aware that owing to the introduction of ministerial responsibility impeachment has fallen into disuse. But I feel that ministerial responsibility in India is only in the making and until the Legislature and the Executive have become conscious of its implications it is better to provide a more direct means of curbing the extravagances of power in the hands of men who are unused to it and who may be led to abuse it by excessive loyalty to caste and creed. A safeguard is never superfluous because it is not often invoked.
In determining the relationship between the members of the executive— whether each should be liable for his acts only or whether each should be liable for the acts of all, in other words, whether the liability should be individual or joint — is a question on which no one can dogmatise. All the same I am for joint responsibility. I am aware that under it the Legislature is practically helpless in the matter of punishing a delinquent minister. With joint responsibility the legislature will not be able to dismiss a minister of whose acts it disapproves ; it will not be in position even formally to censure him, unless it is prepared to get rid of his colleagues as well. This no legislature functioning with a parliamentary executive date do. For if it does, and overthrows the executive, the executive will also overthrow the Legislature by asking for a dissolution. Notwithstanding this defect, I am in favour of joint responsibility and for two reasons. In a modern state the function of the executive as an administering body applying legislation has become a secondary function. Its main function is to determine policy and submit proposals to the Legislature. Indeed so necessary is the function that the usefulness of the Legislatures would be considerably diminished if the executive failed to perform it. But in order that the executive may perform the function of policy-making, there must be a unity of outlook among its members. Such a unity of outlook will not be possible without complete coherence in the executive. Joint responsibility, it appears to me, can alone ensure such coherence. Second