z:\ ambedkar\vol-02\vol2-05.indd MK SJ+YS 21-9-2013/YS-8-11-2013 367
PROVINCIAL LEGISLATURE 367
reason of their numbers. This is a substantial grievance which must be keenly felt as indicated by the evidence from Karnatak. This grievance is bound to increase as the responsible character of the Legislative Council increases and with it the influence which it will exercise upon the conduct of public affairs. There is, therefore, too much reason to fear that instead of dying out, the bitterness of feeling will become more and more acute. It is, therefore, proper that at a time when we are overhauling the machinery of Government with a view to make it a representative and a responsible government, this grievance should also be redressed.
- The evil of over-representation of some parts of this Presidency at the expense of other parts was due to the fact that the Southborough Committee acted quite capriciously and refused to follow any definite principle in the matter of the distribution of seats. I am glad to find that my colleagues have sought to follow a uniform principle in the matter of distribution of seats as far as possible. But my complaint is that they have taken the worst possible principle as the basis of the distribution of seats. Contributions to the exchequer, electors on the roll and population in the constituency are the three conceivable tests that can be adopted as the basis for the distribution of seats. Of these three the test of the electors is the most unjust and indefinite. In the first place where the franchise is so restricted as we now have, it means the rule of wealth. It means that if any particular area on any arbitrary test of property qualification does not produce the basic quota of electors it should go without representation. That this must be inevitable consequence of following the test of electors is clearly brought out in the distribution proposed by the Majority for the Depressed Classes, according to which the Depressed Classes of some parts have enormous representation while those of the other part of the Presidency have no representation at all. A theory which produces such an absurd result must be regarded as indefensible and must be ruled out. Revenue is a better test than the test of electorates. For it may be argued that the power to influence government should be commensurate with the revenue paid to Government. This test must even be rejected as being deceptive and inadequate, owing to the fact that as all revenue might not be paid when it is earned, it would be difficult to know the true revenue of a State. A constituency in which a large revenue is earned may suffer in distribution of seats because it is paid in another. But the most fatal objection to both these tests is that the State does not exist for the benefit of the electors or the tax-payers. Nor does the State limit its coercive action to them. Its jurisdiction extends over all the people who are its subjects irrespective of the question whether or not he is a tax-payer or an elector. From that it follows that the population is the only test for a just and proper distribution of seats. That is the test applied in England and in all countries which have a representative system of government, and I recommend that the seats for the Bombay Legislative Council should be distributed on that basis.