z:\ ambedkar\vol-02\vol2-08.indd MK SJ+YS 21-9-2013/YS-8-11-2013 621
IN THE FEDERAL STRUCTURE COMMITTEE 621
Bills. In the case of non-financial Bills I am prepared to modify the principle applicable to Finance Bills, but for only two purposes. First, the Second Chamber may have power to revise and amend non-financial Bills brought up from the Lower House, subject to the proviso that no amendment shall be made by the Second Chamber which is of a financial character. Secondly, the Second Chamber will have power to hold up, and to enforce so much delay (and no more) in the passing of a non-financial Bill into law, as may be necessary to prevent hasty action, or as may be needed to enable the opinion of the electorate adequately to be expressed upon it. In view of this, my answer to the question propounded in the sub-head dealing with nonfinancial Bills is that the Upper House should have the right to amend a non-financial Bill. If the amendments are accepted by the Lower House, well and good ; but if they are not accepted, then the constitution should provide that, if a non-financial Bill is passed three times by the Lower Chamber in three different sessions of its life, it shall become law, notwithstanding the opposition of the Second Chamber. Lastly, I submit that these relations between the two Houses should be embodied in law, and should not be left to convention. That is all that I have to submit.
† Dr. Ambedkar: Is it your view, Mr. Gavin Jones, that the Constitutions of South Africa and Australia have defined the relations between the two Houses in the manner in which they have done because of the fact that they knew that they were drafting a Constitution for a Federal form of government ?
Mr. Gavin Jones: Yes, certainly.
Dr. Ambedkar: Then why is it that the Canadian Constitution did not lay down any rules regarding the relations of the two Houses ?
Sir Muhammad Shafi: Because the general rule is that the relations shall be the same as those of the House of Lords and the House of Commons.
Dr. Ambedkar: But the House of Lords and the House of Commons make a unitary government, not a federal government. I said this has nothing to do with unitary or federal form of government; and, if you will permit me to proceed, I will say that the various Dominions made the relations of the two Chambers in their constitutions what they were as they found them existing between the House of Lords and House of Commons at the time when they made their constitutions. They were not drafting them either for federal or for unitary. The Canadian Constitution said —
Chairman: You must give Mr. Gavin Jones a chance to speak, Dr. Ambedkar.
Mr. Gavin Jones: All that I would say is that the Australian Constitution is a federal constitution.
†Proceedings of the Federal Structure Committee and Minorities Committee, Vol. I, p. 281-82.