z:\ ambedkar\vol-02\vol2-08.indd MK SJ+YS 21-9-2013/YS-8-11-2013 647
IN THE FEDERAL STRUCTURE COMMITTEE 647
consideration I would like to place before this Committee is this. We are admitting to this Federation some 562 Indian States.
Mr. Jinnah : Are you ?
Dr. Ambedkar: I suppose that is the scheme ; at least that is the ideal we have placed before ourselves that all the Native States will come into this Federation. I think there is no dispute on this point, that a great many of the States, which will be part of the Indian Federation, are financially not strong enough to maintain a competent judiciary. I know of a case in the Bombay Presidency—I am citing a case with which I am acquainted. In Bombay there is a small Native State, the administration of which is run by a lady. In that State, so far as I know, there is only one officer. He acts as a Civil Judge ; he also acts as a Magistrate ; he also acts as a Sessions Judge. From him appeals go to the head of the State, and she is helped by the Diwan who is, so far as I know, a retired revenue official. Most complicated cases come before this tribunal, which is called, so to say, the Privy Council of that State ; and judgments are being given today by a Court so constituted. Now, I do not blame anybody for that. The point is that such a State is so small that it simply has not got sufficient revenue to maintain a competent Court.
Then there is another consideration, namely, that we may, even with respect to British India”, go on creating new Provinces so small that they, again, may not be in a position to maintain, financially speaking, a High Court. The case happens even today. The Province of Assam cannot maintain a High Court. It shares a High Court with the Presidency of Bengal. My submission is this—that if we can improve matters in such a way as to help all these Native States which are small and financially weak to maintain a proper judiciary by allowing to utilise these High Courts which are now functioning in British India for the purpose of administering civil and criminal justice among their subjects, such a plan ought to be welcome. The fact is that, so long as a Provincial High Court is being entirely controlled by a Provincial Government, the States, which have no share in the control of the affairs of the Province, will not care to use the services of the High Court. If, on the other hand, the Provincial High Courts were made a Central subject, where all these States would undoubtedly be represented either directly or indirectly, then there would be more inducement—certainly much less objection on their part—to utilise these High Courts for the purpose of adjudication of civil and criminal disputes among their subjects. The result would be that we would considerably improve the judicial administration in the Native States, which are going to be a part of the future Government of India, without in any sense impairing the efficiency of the Provincial High Courts. On that ground, I suggest that the Provincial High Courts may, for the purposes of administration and also for purposes of finance, be made a Central subject. One of the reasons why the High Court of Calcutta is Central for administration is because it is not a Court exclusively for the