A CRITIQUE OF THE CHANGE 297
interpellation. Its powers of sanctioning and voting upon the Provincial Budget are complete, although provision is made in the Reforms Act, [1] which allows that
“the Local Government shall have power in relation
to any such demand (for a money grant) to act as if it
had been assented to, notwithstanding the withholding
of such assent or the reduction of the amount therein
referred to (by the Provincial Legislature), if the demand
relates to a reserved subject (which is assigned to the
charge of the Governor in Council) and the Governor
certified that the Expenditure provided for by the demand
is essential to the discharge of his responsibility for the
subject.”
Can such a government tackle the problems of sound finance? It is obvious that of the two parts of this dyarchical Executive, one, i.e. the Governor in Council, need have very little anxiety for reduction of expenditure or for the increase of taxation. It derives its mandate from Parliament, and as such is free to adopt any policy—backed up as it is by the certification power of the Governor without any regard for the best interests of the taxpayer. The authors of the Joint Report had seen that this certifying power to override the wishes of the Legislature might lead to irresponsible extravagance on the part of the Governor in Council, and had proposed to endow the Governor in Ministry with a countervailing power which was to act as a curb on the former. That power was to have consisted in the Proviso which laid down that no taxation even in the interests of the “reserved” subjects should be imposed in any Province without the consent of the ministry. [2] The Extremists—a class of politicians in India who were bent upon minimizing the reforms as being inadequate—disliked the proviso as calculated to make scapegoats of ministers and to bring them into discredit with the people. But their rivals, the “Moderates,” now calling themselves “Liberals”—one does not know why—saw clearly what the proviso meant. If this had materialized, there can be no doubt that the ministry would not have been a mere outsider tendering advice to the Council which might be accepted or rejected, but would have obtained a powerful voice in the settlement of the budget.
1 Government of India Act, 1919, sect. II (2) (a).
2 Joint Report, para. 256.