724 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
With regard to the other Commissioners the provision is that, while the power is left with the President to remove them, that power is subjected to a very important limitation, viz., that in the matter of removal of the other Commissioners, the President can only act on the recommendation of the Chief Election Commissioner. My contention therefore is, so far as the question of removal is concerned, the provisions which are incorporated in my amendment are adequate and nothing more is necessary for that purpose.
Now with regard to the question of appointment I must confess that there is a great deal of force in what my friend Professor Saksena said that there is no use making the tenure of the Election Commissioner a fixed and secure tenure if there is no provision in the Constitution to prevent either a fool or a knave or a person who is likely to be under the thumb of the Executive. My provision—I must admit—does not contain anything to provide against nomination of an unfit person to the post of the Chief Election Commissioner or the other Election Commissioners. I do want to confess that this is a very important question and it has given me a great deal of headache and I have no doubt about it that it is going to give this House a great deal of headache. In the U.S.A. they have solved this question by the provision contained in article 2 Section (2) of their Constitution whereby certain appointments which are specified in Section (2) of article 2 cannot be made by the President without the concurrence of the Senate; so that so far as the power of appointment is concerned, although it is vested in the President it is subject to a check by the Senate so that the Senate may, at the time when any particular name is proposed, make enquiries and satisfy itself that the person proposed is a proper person. But it must also he realised that that is a very dilatory process, a very difficult process. Parliament may not be meeting at the time when the appointment is made and the appointment must be made at once without waiting. Secondly, the American practice is likely and in fact does introduce political considerations in the making of appointments. Consequently, while I think that the provisions contained in the American Constitution is a very salutary check upon the extravagance of the President in making his appointments, it is likely to create administrative difficulties and I am therfore hesitating whether I should at a later stage recommend the adoption of the American provisions in our Constitution. The Drafting Committee had paid considerable attention to this