DRAFT CONSTITUTION 775
Prof. Shibban Lal Saksena : During emergency ?
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Yes. Because that is a normal power even in other cases. When there is no emergency both have got power to legislate on the subject. I see therefore no reason why that power should be taken away during emergency. On the other hand I should have thought that emergency was one of the reasons why such a power should be given to the State.
Then with regard to my Friend Mr. Kamath’s criticism that the next article 280, was enough for the purpose, I think that is a misunderstanding of the whole situation, because unless power is given to modify, the suspension has no consequence at all. Therefore article 280 deals with quite a separate matter and has nothing to do with this article. This article should be accepted in the form in which it is proposed.
Mr. President : I will put the amendments to vote.
[3 amendments were negatived. Article 279 was added to the Constitution.]
ARTICLE 280
*Mr. President : Then we take up article 280.
Amendment No. 3028—Dr. Ambedkar.
The Honourable Dr. B. R. Ambedkar : Sir, I move :
“That for the existing article 280, the following article be substituted :—
‘280. Where a Proclamation of Emergency is in operation, the President may by order declare that the right to move any court for the enforcement of the rights conferred by Part III of this Constitution and all proceedings pending in any court for the enforcement of any right so conferred shall remain suspended for the period during which the Proclamation is in operation or for such shorter period as may be specified in the order.’”
The House will see that this article 280 is really an improvement on the original article 280. The original article 280 provided that the order of the President suspending the operation of article 25 should continue for a period of six months after the proclamation has ceased to be in operation. That is to say, that the guarantee such as habeas corpus, writs and so on, would continue to be suspended even though the necessity for suspension had expired. It has been felt that there is no reason why this suspension of the guarantee should continue beyond the necessities of the case. In fact the situation may so improve that the guarantees may become operative even though the Proclamation has not ceased to be in operation. In order, therefore, to permit that the suspension order shall not continue beyond the Proclamation, and may even come to an end much before the time the Proclamation has ceased
- CAD, Vol. IX, date 4th August 1949, p. 186.