DRAFT CONSTITUTION 907
question. In my judgement, apart from the levy of the tax, the severity of the tax also would be an element in considering whether the tax was ultra vires or not. As I said, there is no reference to this important fact in this judgement. I am therefore not prepared to go by that judgement.
I am proceeding along other lines of arguments which I think are substantial and are not open to any criticism. The first point I want to submit is this: that, notwithstanding the fact that the constitutional guarantees which were given in the Constitution of the United States, the United States Supreme Court itself has held that these fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution are not absolute and that the Congress of the United States has, notwithstanding the language used in the Constitution, the right to impose reasonable restrictions on those fundamental rights. In fact I may remind the House that, in the opening speech which I made in support of the motion that this House do proceed to take into consideration the Draft Constitution, I devoted a considerable part to the consideration of this matter, because I had noticed some criticisms in papers and by others, to whom I was bound to pay a certain amount of respect and attention, that our fundamental rights were of no value at all, as they were subjected to various limitations which were enumerated in propositions that follow article 13, namely clauses (2), (3), (4) and (5).
In order to meet those criticisms, I took some trouble to examine the decisions of the Supreme Court on this matter. I did so because at one time I felt that in view of the fact that the constitutional guarantees which were called fundamental rights were enunciated in the Constitution of the United States in absolute terms without any qualifications, it may not have been open to the Supreme Court of the United States to limit those provision. But to my great surprise I found that the United States Supreme Court had taken the very same attitude that we have taken in the framing of the Constitution, namely that fundamental rights, however fundamental they may be, could not be absolute rights. They must be subject to certain limitations.
Now, if the House will permit me I shall quote only one passage from my speech. This is what I said.
“In Gitlow vs. New York, in which the issue was the constitutionaly of a New York, ‘criminal anarchy’ law which purported to punish utterances calculated to bring about violent change, the Supreme Court said :
“It is a fundamental principle, long established that the freedom of speech and of the press, which is secured by the Constitution, does not confer an absolute right