40 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
observations with regard to certain decisions which have necessitated the making of this provision. I think it would be enough if I began from 1924 when a case went up to the Privy Council which is known as Sat Narain versus Behari Lal. The facts of the case briefly were that a Hindu father had been adjudged insolvent. Now under section 17 of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act the property of the insolvent becomes vested in the official Assignee from the date of the adjudication. The property of the Hindu father consists of two things : (i) his share in the joint family property, and (ii) his power to dispose of his sons property in the joint family for his personal debts provided that the debts were not incurred for an immoral purpose. The question that arose in that case before the Privy Council was whether the power of the father to dispose of property of the son is property within the meaning of section 2(e) of the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act. On that issue the Privy Council gave its decision to the effect that the power of the Hindu father to dispose of the property of his son in the joint family was not ‘property’ within the meaning of section 2(e) on the ground that section 2(e) contemplated that power which was absolute over property and power which was not absolute was not property. According to the Privy Council the power of the father to dispose of the sons’ property was not absolute because it was subject to the condition that the debts for which the property could be disposed of must not be immoral. On that ground they did not agree that the Official Assignee could become automatically vested under section 17 with the property belonging to the son. In that particular care that decision of the Privy Council did not matter very much to the creditors, for the simple reason that the Presidency Towns Insolvency Act contains a separate section—section
52—which permits the Official Assignee and the creditors to pursue such property or such capacity to obtain the property of another person. Therefore although in that particular case the property did not automatically vest in the Official Assignee, yet the Official Assignee was free to pursue the property of the son which was liable under the rule of pious obligation to pay the debts of the father by separate proceedings; and I believe he did that.