THE MEANING . . . . . . . . . ‘RECEIPT’ 91
which in opinion are the key words of the clause. The words ‘its receipt’ by themselves are quite unimportant. Their meaning must be derived by reading them in conjunction with the words ‘transmitted to the Legislative Council for its recommendation.’ So read they cannot mean receipt by the Secretariat.
(2) The R.L.A. has not taken into consideration the provisions of clauses (3) and (4). He relied upon clause (5) to justify the result. But he forgets that clause (5) becomes operative only when the steps laid out in clauses (3) and (4) of Article 198 have been gone through by the Legislative Council. Clauses (3) and (4) require that the Council has been in Session and has had an opportunity to consider the Bill.
The rule of construction adopted by the R.L.A. is not a sound rule of construction. The correct rule relevant to the issue is the rule known as ex vicerius actus. It has the authority of no less a person than Coke. Says Coke: “The office of a good expositor of an Act of Parliament is to make construction on all the parts together, and not of one part only by itself……….. It is the most natural and genuine exposition of a Statute to construe one part of a Statute by another of the same Statute, for the best expresseth the meaning of the makers ” (Quoted in Craie’s, P. 95).
The Second contention of the R.L.A. is founded on difference in the language in clause (2) (b) of Article 197 and clause (2) of Article 198. It is true that difference in language exists. It is also true that difference in language can be relied upon by interested parties as an argument in support of the contention that the intentions in two cases are different. As against the argument of the R.L.A. I wish to urge the following considerations–
The original language of clause (2) (b) of Article 197 was the same as that of clause (2) of Article 198. Altogether four drafts of Article 197 were presented to