34 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES
writs in the Kingdom of England; and he thought proper to limit the extent of its civil jurisdiction, of its ecclesiastical jurisdiction, and of its jurisdiction as a Court of Oyer and Terminer; but these are the only respects in which he limited, as to the extent of territory, those powers which the court was to possess. The clause limiting the civil jurisdiction is in these words [clause
28]: “And we do further direct, ordain and appoint, that the jurisdiction, powers, and authorities of the said Supreme Court of Judicature at Bombay shall extend to all such persons as have been heretofore described and distinguished in our charters of justice for Bombay by the appellation of British subjects, who shall reside within any of the factories subject to or dependant upon the Government of Bombay.” It thus states, that all the jurisdiction, powers, and authorities of the Supreme Court of Bombay are to extend to those persons; but it cannot mean that the general jurisdiction of the court extends to no others. But if the whole of the article be read thus, “That the jurisdiction, power, and authority of the Supreme Court of Bombay shall extend to (and that the said court shall be competent and effectual, and shall have full power and authority to hear and determine all suits and actions whatsoever against) any of our said subjects distinguished,” etc.; it would then apply only to the civil jurisdiction alone, as to suits and controversies, and have no reference to any limitation on the other jurisdiction of the court. In like manner the Court of Equity is to extend over all the same persons as those who have civil suits. So again, in speaking of the criminal jurisdiction, the charter
[clause 44] authorizes and empowers the said Supreme Court to “inquire, hear, and determine of all treasons, murders, felonies, misdemeanors, etc. committed by any of the King’s subjects in any of the territories subject to or dependent upon the Government of Bombay.” Now, if all the powers of the court had been previously limited by the clause of the charter granting the civil jurisdiction to subjects residing within the factories, this clause would be inconsistent with it. It, therefore, shows that limitation not to extend to all its powers and authorities, but to its civil jurisdiction alone. The result is then, that first, all the general powers of the Court of King’s Bench throughout a district including Poona and Tannah, the places in question, are given to the Supreme Court; then a civil authority is given, limited to a smaller district; and then other jurisdiction are given it, limited in the same manner.