AND THE LORD SAID UNTO— 37
in the manner described. In Bourn’s case, Cro. James, p. 543, “Montague, Chief Justice, said that the privilege of the Cinque Ports, that the King’s writ runs not there, is to be intended between party and party, but no such privilege can be against the King : and this writ (a writ of habeas corpus ) is a prerogative writ which concerns the King’s justice to be administered to his subject; for the King ought to have an account why any of his subjects are imprisoned; and it is agreeable to all persons and places, and no answer can satisfy it but to return the clause with paratum habeo corpus, etc.; and this writ hath been awarded out of this court to Calais, and all other places within the Kingdom, and to dispute it is not to dispute the jurisdiction, but the power of the King and His Court, which is not to be disputed; and of this opinion were all the other justices;” This doctrine of Lord Chief Justice Montague is fortified by precedents of the King’s writ having been awarded to Calais and other places within the dominion of the Crown of England, and has been fully recognized by the Courts in a variety of cases between that time and this. Lord Mansfield, in the case of Cowle, 2 Burrow’s Reports, p. 834, laid it down that the King’s writ must be said to run in all places throughout his dominions, but that this was not the case with all writs; and therefore, when he came to lay down the rule in that case, his Lordship directed it to be entered that writs of venire facias do not run in the town of Berwick; but he decided also, that the high prerogative writs arising out of a different source have a much more extensive operation. Now these high prerogative arise out of the natural allegiance the subject owes to the King, and the protection which that allegiance requires of the King for the subject? This is the principle which is stated in Calvin’s case in 7th Report (1), viz., that allegiance is the duty of the subject, and that protection is the duty of the King. Whenever therefore the subject owes allegiance, the King owes protection. Now can it be contended that in the case of any conquered country annexed to his Majesty’s dominions the inhabitants of that country do not owe him allegiance? If they do, it must follow that the King must owe them protection, and that protection is to be, as in the present instance, given, by his issuing by virtue of his prerogative his writ of habeas corpus, that he may know whether they are lawfully imprisoned or not; or his writ of certiorari, that he may know whether any