4. And the Lord said Unto— - Page 71

48 DR. BABASAHEB AMBEDKAR : WRITINGS AND SPEECHES

to their respective modes and purposes of proceeding, the great depositaries of the universal justice of the realm, and as such, in every instance in which it is attempted to withdraw a case from their cognizance, bound to see, distinctly and unequivocally, that a jurisdiction adequate to the object in view exists elsewhere. If that be not stated so as to appear to the court, a plea to the jurisdicton fails, and the jurisdiction remains. But it is different here, because, though coordinate in its nature with those courts so far as its jurisdiction attaches, the jurisdiction of this court is limited with regard to persons not being British subjects.” This passage, we apprehend, bears on the very subject under consideration here. Though there are words in this charter giving to the court the authority of the Court of King’s Bench, it is the nature of the authority which is described, and not the extent of the jurisdiction. The extent of the jurisdiction is limited by other clauses; but the nature of the authority which the Judges are entitled to exercise where they have jurisdiction, whether within the local limits in respect of the inhabitants generally, or beyond the local limits in respect of British subjects, for English purposes, and administering English law, is in the nature of the authority exercised by the Court of King’s Bench in England. “Generally speaking,” adds Sir Thomas Strange (page 136), “it is restricted with regard to the natives (whether wisely or not is not for us to consider) to the inhabitants of Madras, and the plea therefore very properly confines itself to these facts; upon which the court is fairly called upon to say, whether the defendants, being natives, can be considered as inhabitants of Madras for the purpose of being subject to our jurisdiction upon the present bill. It is said in many cases, boni judicis est ampliare jurisdictionem. If for jurisdictionem be read (as was always read by Lord Mansfield) justitiam, it is a noble maxim. If an object and matter of jurisdiction exists, it is indeed the part of a Judge so far as circumstances may admit, to administer an enlarged and amplified justice, embracing the interests of all parties and all the bearings of the case in any other sense of the maxim. It seems to me that the strength of every jurisdiction consists mainly in a temperate admeasurement of it by those in whom it is vested; and that so far from its being the duty boni judicis ampliare, it becomes none more than Judges to set to others in power a different